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HERE are obvious difficulties in attempting to relate doctrines of
res judicata and estoppel and cognate judicial concepts to ad-
ministrative determinations. Consequently some authorities have
declared that the sovereign United States cannot be estopped and that
the Government cannot be prejudiced by the action or omission of a
single officer.' Similar declarations can be found in the decisional litera-
ture of immigration and nationality.2 While it is true that these precepts
t The opinions expressed are the author's and do not necessarily represent the views
of the Department of Justice.
I Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service; coauthor of
GORDON & RosENFTlPT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE (1959); Adjunct Professor
of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
I E.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947); Utah Power &
Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917).
2 E.g., Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281, 284 (1906); Bridges v. United States, 199
F.2d 811, 826 (9th Cir. 1952), rev'd, 346 U.S. 209, 234 (1953) (dissent, in decision reversing
lower court on another ground); United States ex rel. Vajta v. Watkins, 179 F.2d 137
(2d Cir. 1950); United States ex rel. Lapides v. Watkins, 165 F.2d 1017, 1019 (2d Cir. 1948);
Chin Kai Su v. Dulles, 157 F. Supp. 190 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Mannerfrid v. Brownell, 145
F. Supp. 55, 56 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 238 F.2d 32 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1017
(1957); cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 157 (1963) (although finding no
estoppel, assumes U.S. may be estopped); McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960)
(misleading statements); Choy Yuen Chan v. United States, 30 F.2d 516, 517 (9th Cir.
1929) (admission as citizen).
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have been disputed by some courts and scholars,8 they unquestionably
represent the prevailing view. 4
Experience teaches, however, that such generalizations are treacherous,
particularly in specific and appealing factual situations. Moreover, all
of us know that judicial attitudes are constantly changing, and that the
immutable dogmas of yesterday often become the rejects of today. This
process of re-evaluation has been accelerated in recent years by changes
in the personnel of the United States Supreme Court: The accession of
a single new Justice can, and sometimes does, mean a change in direc-
tion.
The possible applicability 6f res judicata, estoppel and like principles
in immigration and nationality matters has received passing mention in
some discussions of the general subject, but has never been studied in
detail. It should be of interest therefore, to explore and compare with
developing standards of finality in other areas of administrative regula-
tion the many facets of legislative, judicial and administrative policy
in immigration and nationality matters.
The immigration and nationality laws doubtless occupy a special
place in the folklore of adjudication. The courts frequently have gone
to great lengths to avoid the severe impact of these laws in individual
cases. 5 But amelioration is to some extent governed and limited by
statutory directives. Statutes, however, consist of words, and since it is
a prime judicial function to construe (or perhaps "construct"6 ) the
language of statutes, statutory language generally leaves a wide area for
judicial maneuver, sometimes in directions that may be surprising.
An illustration of these tensions between statutory directive and judi-
cial preference may be found in the decisions dealing with efforts to
invoke the principles of estoppel and res judicata in immigration and
nationality matters. To some extent these principles have been con-
3 See 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, §§ 17.01-17.09 (1958); GELLHoRN & BYSE,
ADumISTRATIvE LAW 1168, 1207 (4th ed. 1960). Among other valuable discussions and
reviews of federal and state authorities are: Berger, Estoppel Against the Government,
21 U. CH. L. REv. 680 (1954); Groner & Sternstein, Res Judicata in Federal Administra-
tive Law, 39 IowA L. REv. 300 (1954); Parker, Administrative Res Judicata, 40 ILL.
L. REv. 56, 77-78 (1945); Schopflocher, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative
Law, 1942 Wis. L. REv. 5, 198; Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv.
L. REV. 818, 865 (1952); Note, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 640 (1949); Note, 4 RUTGERS L. REV.
706 (1950); Note, 49 YALE E.J. 1250 (1940).
4 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 3.
5 E.g., Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S.
6,10 (1948).
6 Clark, J., dissenting in Rosenberg v. Fleut, supra note 5, at 463: "'statutory
construction' means to me that the Court can construe statutes but not that it can
construct them."
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sidered by the courts as overlapping.7 In many instances the courts have
avoided mention of res judicata or estoppel but have dealt in other
terminology, such as "voluntariness,"8 "laches," 9 "equitable results,"1 0
"law of the case"'" or "due process."' 2 The controlling considerations
may vary with the different areas in which the problems arise. We will
therefore examine those areas separately. Our primary concern will not
be with the precise terminology of estoppel, but rather with efforts to
preclude the Government from asserting a fact or legal postulate that
normally would be available.
I. EFFECT OF ADMINISTRATIvE DETERMINATIONS
A logical starting point for our discussion is with the effect of ad-
ministrative determinations on subsequent proceedings. Such determina-
tions are potent and their consequences far-reaching. They can bar or
permit entry into the United States.13 They can terminate the privilege
of an alien to reside in the United States.' 4 They can rule for or against
claims to United States citizenship. 15 They can prolong or curtail tem-
porary sojourns in this country.C They can furnish documents attesting
lawful alien or citizen status.' 7 Are such determinations binding on those
who make them and on others? Can they be disregarded when future
occasion or need arises?
The answer to these questions depends, of course, on an evaluation
of competing interests. On the one hand is a desire for assurance that
7 See, e.g., Mannerfrid v. Brownell, 145 F. Supp. 55 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 238 F.2d 32 (D.C.
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1017 (1957); Bridges v. United States, 199 F.2d 811 (9th
Cir. 1952), rev'd, 346 U.S. 209 (1953).
8 See cases cited notes 136-38 infra.
9 Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961).
10 McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1960); United States v. Anastasio,
226 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956); Uyeno v. Acheson, 96
F. Supp. 510, 520 (W.D. Wash. 1951).
11 Mannerfrid v. Brownell, 145 F. Supp. 55 (D.D.C.), afJ'd, 238 F.2d 32 (D.C. Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1017 (1957); United States ex rel. Koehler v. Corsi, 60 F.2d 123
(2d Cir. 1932).
12 See United States ex rel. Durante v. Holton, 228 F.2d 827 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 963 (1956); United State ex rel. Marino v. Holton, 227 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956); United States v. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619
(S.D. Cal. 1959).
13 Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 235-36, 66 Stat. 198 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225-26
(1958).
14 Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 241-42, 66 Stat. 204 (1952), as amended, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1251-52 (1958).
15 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253
(1905).
16 8 C.F.R. § 214.1 (1963).
17 See notes 61 and 116 infra.
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official rulings can be relied on and that controversies be finally resolved
-a desire which also underlies the principle of res judicata. On the
other hand is the need to make certain that governmental benefits will
be granted only in conformity with law. In the last analysis, the choice
between these alternatives often will be governed by an assessment of
legislative goals, provided they are consistent with the mandates of the
Constitution.
1. Entry of Aliens into the United States
This is an area in which the legislative purpose is dearly articulated.
Congress has declared that an alien, can achieve lawful entry into the
United States only upon strict compliance with the qualifications and
procedures prescribed by law, and it has insisted that no alien entrant
or applicant for entry is afforded any security of status if it appears that
he has not complied with those requirements.
This legislative design emerges at the very inception of the process
for entry into the United States. A prerequisite to entry by an alien is
the procurement of a visa from an American consul stationed in a
foreign country.18 Consular officers are authorized to issue visas and are
prohibited from issuing them to aliens who appear to be inadmissible
under the requirements established by Congress. 19 In passing upon visa
applications, consuls do not conduct formal hearings but make their
determinations on the basis of the documents submitted by the appli-
cants.20
Under the terms of the statute, a consul's denial of a visa is not sub-
ject to review, even by the Secretary of State,21 although in recent years
an informal review procedure has been established by the Department
18 Aliens seeking permanent entry are required to obtain immigrant visas. Immigra-
don and Nationality Act §§ 101(a)(16), 211, 66 Stat. 169, 181 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101
(a)(16), 1181 (1958). Aliens seeking temporary entry are required to obtain nonimmigrant
visas. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 101(a)(26), 212(a)(26), 66 Stat. 169, 184
(1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(26), 1182(a)(26) (1958).
19 Immigration and Nationality Act § 221, 66 Stat. 191 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1201 (1958).
20 Immigration and Nationality Act § 222, 66 Stat. 193 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1202 (1958);
22 C.F.R. §§ 41.110, 42.110 (Supp. 1963).
21 Immigration and Nationality Act § 104(a), 66 Stat. 174 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a)
(1958). The statutory provision, which bars administrative review, is criticized in
Whom We Shall Welcome, REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S COM MISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALizATiON at 146-52 (1953); Rosenfield, Consular Non-Reviewability: A Case
Study in Administrative Absolutism, 41 A.B.A.J. 1109 (1955); Wildes, Review of Denial
of Visa, 142 N.Y.L.J., Nos. 96, 97, and 98; 36 INTRPRTE RELEASEs 331, 344 (1959).
In addition, the consul's denial of a visa has not been deemed subject to judicial review.
United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929). See Note, 39
COLUm. L. REv. 502, 505 (1939).
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of State.2 2 And even the consul's issuance of a visa does not assure the
holder of admission to the United States if, upon arrival at a port of
entry, he is found to be inadmissible.23 The law requires that the sub-
stance of this directive be printed upon every visa application. 24 And it
authorizes the consul or the Secretary of State, in his discretion, to revoke
the visa after it has been issued.25 The Attorney General and his subor-
dinates are required to turn back all persons they find not entitled to
enter, including those to whom visas have been issued.26 Thus it can be
stated unequivocally that the issuance of a visa does not preclude chal-
lenge to the alien's right to enter.
The same lack of finality attaches to a document known as a re-entry
permit, issued by the Attorney General to an alien in the United States
who seeks to make a temporary visit abroad.2 The law states that a
re-entry permit shall be acceptable in lieu of a visa as a document
needed for entry but that it shall have no other effect than to show that
its holder is returning from a temporary visit abroad.28 Although an un-
impeached re-entry permit is entitled to prima facie effect,29 the holder
of such a document may be excluded, upon his return to the United
States, if the re-entry permit was improperly issued30 or the alien is
found otherwise excludable.31 The courts have refused to endorse any
22 22 C.F.R. §§ 42.130, 41.130 (Supp. 1963). The State Department's procedures are
described and defended in Auerbach, The Administration of the Immigration Laws by
the Department of State and the Foreign Service, 36 INTanERrM Lr.Ass 6 (1959),
Visa Office Bulletin No. 40 (1959); Auerbach, The Visa Process and Review of Visa
Applications, 37 INTEaI~rm RELEAss 305 (1960), Visa Office Bulletin No. 63 (1960).
23 Immigration and Nationality Act § 221(h), 66 Stat. 192 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(h)
(1958).
24 Ibid.
25 Immigration and Nationality Act § 221(i), 66 Stat. 192 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i)
(1958). In addition, see 22 C.F.R. § 42.134 (Supp. 1963).
26 Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 221(h), 235(b), 236-37, 66 Stat. 192, 199, 200
(1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(h), 1225(b), 1226-27 (1958).
27 Authorized by Immigration and Nationality Act § 223, 66 Stat. 194 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1203 (1958).
28 Immigration and Nationality Act § 223(e), 66 Stat. 195 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1203(e)
(1958).
29 United States ex rel. Iodice v. Wixon, 56 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1932); United States
ex rel. Poppovich v. Karnuth, 25 F. Supp. 883 (W.D.N.Y. 1938).
30 Yoshihara v. Carmichael, 115 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1940) (original entry not lawful);
United States ex rel. Lamp v. Corsi, 61 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1932) (same); United States
ex rel. Poppovich v. Karnuth, supra note 29 (same).
31 United States ex rel. Leon v. Murff, 250 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1957) (sexual deviate);
United States ex rel. Barber v. Rietmann, 248 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1957) (had claimed
relief from military service); Ex parte DiStephano, 25 F.2d 902 (D. Mass. 1928) (il-
literate); United States ex rel. Matterazza v. Fogarty, 13 F. Supp. 403 (W.D.N.Y. 1936)
(public charge).
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element of estoppel arising from the issuance of such visas or re-entry
permits.8 2 They have ruled that, regardless of any document he may have
received, any alien who seeks to enter the United States can gain ad-
mittance only if he is found admissible at the time of his application
for entry.33
Is an alien's status less vulnerable if he has passed the scrutiny of im-
migration officers and has been admitted to the United States? Here again
the explicit statutory pattern appears to require a negative answer.
The statute erects an elaborate mechanism for preventing unlawful
entries. Immigration officers are authorized to inspect all arriving aliens
and to detain those not "clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land."34
Those detained in this manner ordinarily are referred to a special inquiry
officer who conducts a formal hearing to determine their admissibility.35
On the basis of this hearing the special inquiry officer is empowered to
admit the applicant or to direct that he be excluded and deported.3 6 The
statute specifies that the special inquiry officer's decision excluding an
alien "shall be final unless reversed on appeal to the Attorney General." 37
An administrative appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals is pro-
vided by regulations and there is a limited opportunity for judicial
review. 39
Under the terms of the statute finality is accorded only to a special
inquiry officer's decision excluding an applicant.4 0 The necessary im-
plication is that the admission of an alien is not intended to be an
32 Chang Chan v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 346 (1925); Alarcon-Baylon v. Brownell, 250 F.2d
45 (5th Cir. 1957).
33 Sohaiby v. Savoretti, 195 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1952); Del Castillo v. Carr, 100 F.2d
338 (9th Cir. 1938); United States v. Parisi, 24 F. Supp. 414 (D. Md. 1938); and cases
cited notes 50-32 supra.
84 Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b), 66 Stat. 198 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)
(1958).
35 Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(c), 66 Stat. 198 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)
(1958), authorizes exclusion without a hearing in exceptional cases, on the basis of
confidential security information. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 38 U.S. 537 (1950); cf.
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
36 Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(a), 66 Stat. 200 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
(1958).
37 Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(c), 66 Stat. 200 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
(1958).
38 8 C.F.R. § 236.5 (1963).
39 § 106(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 174 (1952), as amended,
8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(b) (Supp. IV, 1963), now restricts such review to habeas corpus. Before
this amendment became effective in 1961, declaratory review under the Administrative
Procedure Act was available. Brownell v. Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956).




irrevocable act. This implication is reinforced by a number of explicit
edicts. Thus, the statute specifies that a determination admitting an
alien shall be subject to challenge by any other immigration officer, who
can refer the matter to a special inquiry officer.41 Another provision of
the statute commands the expulsion, after entry, of any alien who "at
the time of entry was within one or more of the classes of aliens exclud-
able by the law existing at the time of such entry."42 Still another direc-
tive explicitly applies the latter mandate to aliens who have entered
improperly at any time in the past.43 And the courts have upheld the
retroactivity of that directive even though it specifies no period of
limitation.44
Thus the alien in our midst has no ultimate security of status. Even
though he has been granted a visa and been passed by an immigration
officer, he has acquired no immunity from deportation, and can be ex-
pelled at any time if it later is ascertained that his entry was induced
by fraud or was otherwise irregular. And such insecurity may continue
even after he has acquired citizenship by naturalization, since his
naturalization may be subject to revocation at any time if it is discovered
that his original entry was tainted by deception. 45
In practice, of course, this phenomenon actually affects only a minute
proportion of the hundreds of thousands of aliens who come to the
United States each year. Virtually all of the inadmissibles have been
winnowed out by the consuls in considering whether to issue a visa, and
the holder of such a document is virtually certain to be passed by the
immigration officers. And the right to continued residence of those ad-
mitted by immigration officers hardly ever is questioned. 40 Moreover, the
law affords many opportunities for amelioration for an alien resident in
this country whose entry is found to have been irregular.4 7 Yet the ad-
41 Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b), 66 Stat. 198 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)
(1958). The purpose of this provision is not clear and its practical impact is negligible.
42 Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(1), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251
(a)(1) (1958).
43 Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(d), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(d)
(1958).
44 Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957); Mulcahey v.
Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692 (1957); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
45 Immigration and Nationality Act § 340, 66 Stat. 260 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1958).
46 In fiscal year 1962, 283,763 alien immigrants were admitted for permanent res-
idence. In the same year 7,637 aliens were deported and less than half of these
deportations resulted from irregularities in entry. In the latter group only a negligible
number actually had been in possession of immigrant visas at the time of their entry.
1962 INS ANNUAL REPOPT 21, 66.
47 See GORDON & ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE ch. 7 (1959); Gordon,
Discretionary Relief from Deportation, Decalogue Journal, Sept.-Oct. 1960, p. 6; Maltin,
Relief from Deportation, 38 INTERPRErER RELEAsEs 150 (1961).
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ministrative authorities are empowered to expel those they have admitted
if it later develops that they were deceived or mistaken. Through the
years they have exercised this authority in many cases, even where the
irregularity was long undetected and their decrees have always been
approved by the courts.48
One may inquire whether there is any room for the application of the
principle of res judicata to entry cases. On their face, the statutory pre-
scriptions we have discussed appear to exclude such a possibility. More-
over, the process of issuing a visa or of admitting an alien to this country,
when no question as to his admissibility is apparent, lacks the formality
of adjudication which engendered the judicial principle of res judicata.4 9
Perhaps a distinction might be made, however, when the alien's admis-
sibility has been approved by a special inquiry officer. Such an officer,
as we have noted, renders his decision on the basis of a hearing at which
testimony is taken and the facts are developed. The proceedings before
him thus may be characterized as quasi-judicial.
This very problem was considered in 1906 by the Supreme Court in
Pearson v. Williams.50 There an alien was admitted by a board of special
inquiry, a three member body which then performed the functions now
reposed in the special inquiry officer.51 A month later deportation pro-
ceedings were brought before the same board of special inquiry and a
hearing was conducted on the same issue-excludability as a contract
laborer. Deportation was ordered on the ground that the alien was
excludable at the time of his entry. The Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Holmes, found that deportation was not precluded
by res judicata and declared that the policy of the statute
obviously was to give a chance for fuller investigation than is
possible at the moment of landing, when any inquiry necessarily
must be of a very summary sort. . . . The board is an instru-
ment of the executive power, not a court. It is made up . . .
of the immigrant officials . . . . whose duties are declared to be
administrative by § 23. Decisions of a similar type long have
been recognized as decisions of the executive department, and
cannot constitute res judicata in a technical sense. . . . The
board has no power to compel witnesses to attend, but, . . .
must decide upon such evidence as is at hand or is readily
accessible. These are considerations against the likelihood that
48 See cases cited note 44 supra.
49 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942), specifies on page 2 that it "does not deal with
the effect of the decisions of administrative tribunals."
50 202 U.S. 281 (1906).
51 This function was first assigned to a single officer in 1952. See S. REP'. No. 1137,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1952).
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Congress meant such decisions to be binding upon the Secretary
of Commerce and Labor, the superior officer of the members of
the Board.52
In the ensuing fifty-seven years, this holding, insofar as it deals with
the rights of aliens, has never been questioned, qualified or even re-
considered by any court.5 3 But time has eroded some of the assumptions
upon which Mr. Justice Holmes relied. Proceedings before special in-
quiry officers are by no means as summary as they were in 1906. Indeed,
in some respects they resemble a judicial trial. Every effort is made to
assemble all the evidence before arriving at a decision and in some in-
stances this process may be quite prolonged.54 While the proceeding is
pending the applicant usually is permitted to enter the United States
under parole. 55 He may be represented by counsel and the Government
may be represented by a trial attorney.56 The special inquiry officer now
has power to subpoena witnesses. 57 Thus the special inquiry officer's con-
sideration in quite different from the summary inquiry envisaged by Mr.
Justice Holmes.
It is by no means certain, however, that these changes require an
abandonment of the Pearson doctrine. Many authorities still adhere to
the Holmes view that res judicata does not inhibit administrative re-
consideration of prior determinations that do not conform to law.58
Account also must be" taken of the positive expressions of legislative
policy requiring expulsion of all aliens who were inadmissible at the
time of entry and declaring that only exclusionary decisions of spelcial
inquiry officers shall be final.59 The courts might well conclude, as they
have under comparable circumstances in denaturalization cases,6 0 that
Congress intended the deportation process as a cumulative protection of
52 202 U.S. at 284-85.
53 See Chan v. United States, 30 F.2d 516, 517 (9th Cir. 1929), where the court
declared that that decision of a board of special inquiry should be given prima fade
effect. However, this involved a person who had been admitted as an American citizen.
The special rules applied in such cases are discussed at notes 108-26 infra.
54 See, e.g., Matter of M-, 8 1. & N. Dec. 24 (A.G. 1958).
55 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 182 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5) (1958); Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958); Pefluck, New Detention
Policy of the 1.NS., 32 INTm.PR'rEr RELEss 110, 111 (1955).
50 Immigration and Nationality Act § 292, 66 Stat. 235 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1958)
(right to counsel); 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(c) (1963) (assignment of trial attorney). See Gordon,
The Right to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, 45 MNN. L. REv. 875 (1961).
57 Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(a), 66 Stat. 198 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)
(1958); 8 C.F.R. § 287.4 (1963).
58 See notes 2, 32 and 33 supra.
59 See notes 23, 26, 37, 42 and 43 supra.
60 See notes 192-201 infra.
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the public interest against fraud or illegality in the original proceeding.
On the other hand, in recent years the courts have sought to alleviate
the severities of the deportation statutes against longtime alien residents
of this country. Experience has demonstrated that the courts, if they are
so disposed, will find a way to read the language of such statutes as per-
mitting a result they deem desirable.
Possibly the problem we have discussed is largely hypothetical. It is
unquestionably true that the administrative authorities ordinarily will
not attempt deportation proceedings in a matter which was thoroughly
litigated at the time of entry unless there is strong evidence of fraud. Yet
such cases may develop, and in that event efforts may be made to re-
appraise the Pearson doctrine in the light of modern conditions.
2. Grant of Lawful Status to Aliens in the United States
The immigration law now sanctions a number of discretionary devices
by which the Attorney General may grant permanent lawful residence
to aliens whose status in the United States is irregular. Among these are
remedies known as suspension of deportation,61 adjustment of status, 62
registry63 and waiver of inadmissibility.64 Such relief may be granted by
the Attorney General, after submission to him of an application and
accompanying documents, upon his determination that the applicant
has satisfied the prescribed statutory qualifications and merits the exercise
of discretion. A formal hearing is not necessarily entailed although, since
1962, applications for suspension of deportation, adjustment of status
and registry may be submitted and considered during the deportation
proceeding. 65
What security of status does the grant of such relief by the Attorney
General afford to the alien in the United States? In 1950, a United States
Court of Appeals invalidated an administrative regulation which pur-
61 Immigration and Nationality Act § 244, 66 Stat. 214 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §
1254 (Supp. IV, 1963). Suspension of deportation waives deportabiity and grants lawful
permanent residence status.
62 Immigration and Nationality Act § 245, 66 Stat. 217 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255 (1958). Adjustment of status grants lawful permanent residence status to certain
aliens in the United States who would be immediately entitled to immigrant visas
if they were abroad.
63 Immigration and Nationality Act § 249, 66 Stat. 219 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1259 (1958). Registry creates a record of lawful admission for permanent residence for
certain longtime resident aliens whose original entry was irregular.
64 Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(c), (f), (g), (h), 66 Stat. 182 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
99 1182(c), (g), (h), (i) (1958), and § 241(f), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(f) (Supp. IV, 1963). These statutes permit waiver of some grounds of inadmis-
sibility for certain aliens with long residence or with close family ties in the United
States.
65 8 C.F.R. § 242.17 (1963).
[Vol. 31.433
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
ported to grant authority to revoke a certificate of registry obtained by
fraud, finding it precluded by the absence of direct statutory authority
and suggesting that the only remedies were a court action for rescission or
a criminal prosecution.66 While the court may have been too niggardly in
its view of an administrative agency's capacity to deal with fraud, it ap-
pears to have been influenced by the existence of specific statutory author-
ity to revoke other types of certificates67 and by the knowledge that Con-
gress could easily remedy the deficiency exposed by the decision. Support
for the belief that such a certificate cannot easily be disregarded also may
be found in the ruling of another Court of Appeals refusing denaturali-
zation where an unrevoked registry certificate had been fraudulently
procured. 8 This ruling no doubt also was attributable to special cir-
cumstances-the fact that evidence of the fraud had been in the Govern-
ment's files at the time of naturalization and the particular deference
shown by the courts to established citizenship rights. Despite these cases,
however, it is doubtful that the award of discretionary dispensation as-
sures full security of status.
In the 1952 codification of the immigration laws, Congress explicitly
authorized administrative rescission of suspension of deportation, ad-
justment of status or registry if the Attorney General was satisfied that
the grantee "was not in fact eligible" for such relief.69 If the grantee
obtained naturalization on the basis of the award of lawful residence
status which was thereafter revoked, denaturalization proceedings could
be brought against him.7 0
The statute prescribes a five year statute of limitation for such adminis-
trative rescission proceedings. 71 This may mean that after five years 'the
Government is precluded from rescinding a grant of suspension of de-
portation, adjustment of status, or registry although other remedies such
as a court proceeding to nullify the grant may still be open.72
Having granted such lawful residence status, are the administrative
66 Jeager v. Simrany, 180 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1950).
67 See note 121 infra.
68 United States v. Anastasio, 226 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931
(1956).
69 Immigration and Nationality Act § 246(a), 66 Stat. 217 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a)
(1958). The administrative process for accomplishing such rescissions is set forth in
8 C.F.R. § 246 (1963).
70 Immigration and Nationality Act § 246(b), 66 Stat. 218 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1256(b)
(1958).
71 Immigration and Nationality Act § 246(a), 66 Stat. 217 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a)
(1958).
72 See Quintana v. Holland, 255 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1958), which found that a decision
rescinding suspension of deportation was too late if made more than 5 years after the
grant. However, the court did not discuss the possible availability of other remedies.
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authorities free to ignore this grant if it later appears that the award
should not have been made? Analogy to the entry cases would appear
to support the view that the grant may be disregarded if the applicant
actually was unqualified at the time the grant was made. On the other
hand, specific statutory provision for a rescission proceeding 73 would
appear to suggest that the grant is to be honored unless the statutory
rescission procedure is followed.7 4
This problem has not yet been definitively settled. One administrative
ruling deemed the statutory procedure exclusive, and found it "improper"
to disregard an unrescinded grant of lawful status through registry.75
Another, however, ruled that, like an admission to the United States,
the remedy of adjustment of status did not waive excludability or de-
portability and that it could be disregarded if improperly obtained.76
A court decision on a related problem has found an alien in irregular
status in the United States who had been granted a former remedy known
as pre-examination, 77 which approved his leaving the United States and
returning as a lawful permanent resident, was nevertheless deportable
if he was inadmissible at the time of his re-entry.78 The court found
deportation not precluded by res judicata or estoppel. Perhaps this
decision can be distinguished on several grounds: (1) Pre-examination
did not in itself accord permanent status; (2) There was no specific
statutory provision for rescission of pre-examination; (3) In re-entering
73 Another grant for which the statute expressly provides a revocation procedure
relates to preliminary petitions, commonly called visa petitions, for the approval of
preferred status for certain immigrants and nonimmigrants. See Immigration and
Nationality Act § 206, 66 Stat. 181 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1156 (1958); 8 C.F.R. § 206
(1958). A cumulative sanction in such cases would be a refusal of the consul to issue
a visa or the refusal of immigration officers to permit entry, even in the face of an
unrevoked visa petition. See notes 19 and 26 supra.
74 In a number of other situations the statute does not specifically prescribe for
revocation of a dispensation, once it is allowed. See, e.g., Matter of T-, 9 I. & N. Dec.
239 (1961), in which an extension of temporary stay was revoked, despite the absence of
direct statutory sanction.
75 Matter of V-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 363 (1956). See note 63 supra. For similar results
see Matter of S-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 536 (1957) (permission to reapply after deportation,
no direct provision for revocation); Matter of G- A-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1956) (waiver
of inadmissibility, no direct provision for revocation, disregard would be "repugnant').
76 Matter of S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 548 (1962).
77 Pre-examination was an administrative device which was ended in 1952 and
largely supplanted by the remedy known as adjustment of status. See S. REP. No. 1515,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 603-06 (1950); Matter of B-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 542 (1953).
78 Mannerfrid v. Brownell, 238 F.2d 32 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1017
(1957), expressly approving lower court in 145 F. Supp. 55 (D.D.C. 1956). But cf. Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 157 (1963), in which the Court articulated dictum
that "the United States may be estopped to deny even an erroneous prior determina-
tion of status . ..."
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the United States, the alien became subject to the explicit statut6ry
formula barring inadmissibles; (4) The court did not regard itself bound
by an administrative ruling.
In any event, it seems that there is an unexplained disparity of treat-
ment between aliens acquiring permanent residence status through entry
into the United States and those granted such status in this country. For
the former, no statute of limitations for deportation is prescribed; for
the latter, the statute fixes a five year period of limitation for rescission
of the grant. The status of the former apparently can be challenged at
any time if they were improperly admitted; at least in some instances,
the status of the latter may be secure after five years and possibly cannot
be questioned even during the five year period unless a rescission pro-
ceeding is brought.
No reasonable basis for such diverse treatment is apparent. If a deter-
mination improperly granting lawful status for an entrant is assailable
at any time, it would appear that a similar determination granting such
status for an alien already in the United States should be similarly vul-
nerable. Conversely, if it is deemed desirable to fix a five year period of
limitation for withdrawing a grant of residence status to those in the
United States, it is difficult to see why similar benefits should not be
accorded to those awarded permanent residence through a determination
made at the time of entry. In their present form, of course, the statutes
provide differently for these two situations. But a cogent argument could
be made for establishing a consistent pattern.
3. Prior Deportation Proceeding
The expulsion of an alien resident of the United States patently is a
matter of the utmost gravity. The proceedings to make such a determina-
tion have consequently been fashioned to assure a maximum of fair
consideration. The process, of course, is administrative, not judicial. But
the Supreme Court long ago declared that procedural due process was
a necessary prerequisite to a deportation order, and that this entailed
a fair hearing with notice of the charges; an opportunity to confront,
examine and cross-examine witnesses; to be represented by counsel; and
to have a decision based on substantial evidence in a hearing record.79
These essentials of procedural due process are now incorporated in the
statute.8 0 Under current procedure a full hearing, which has become in-
creasingly formalized over the years, is conducted before a special inquiry
79 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,
339 U.S. 33 (1950); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
80 Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(b), 66 Stat. 209 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)
(1958).
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officer.8' The respondent can be represented by counsel,8 2 and in con-
tested or unusual cases the Government is represented by a trial attor-
ney.83 Either party can appeal the special inquiry officer's decision to the
Board of Immigration Appeals, an administrative body established by the
Attorney General's regulations.8 4 In some instances the Attorney General
himself may review the Board's dacision.8 5 And a person whose deporta-
tion is ordered can obtain judicial review.86
The deportation proceeding thus resembles a judicial trial in many
respects, particularly in its emphasis on a fair hearing and fair considera-
tion. It could therefore be argued that there is room for the application
of some form of res judicata. The absence of a statutory injunction
against finality similar to that leveled against determinations of admis-
sibility lends support to the argument. The statute merely says that an
order of deportation "shall be final," 87 and that direction has been
construed to relate merely to the terminal point of the administrative
proceeding and to the availability of judicial review.88 It says nothing
about the amenability of the decision to re-examination or to the finality
of a decision that an alien resident is not deportable.
Attempts to invoke res judicata or some analogous principle as to
determinations in deportation cases have thus far been inconclusive. The
question has been raised most frequently when an alien who has been
deported succeeds in re-entering the United States irregularly and at-
tempts to attack the original expulsion order in the new deportation
proceedings based on his irregular re-entry after deportation. This is
the obverse of the situation we have discussed in other contexts since
res judicata, if applied, would be invoked by the Government, rather
than against it.
The administrative authorities initially ruled that the original deporta-
tion order could not be collaterally attacked in this manner.8 9 This posi-
81 Ibid.; 8 C.F.R. § 242.8(a) (1958).
82 Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 242(b), 292, 66 Stat. 209, 235 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
99 1252(b), 1362 (1958). See Gordon, Right to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings,
45 MINN. L. REv. 875 (1961).
83 8 C.F.R. § 242.9(b) (Supp. 1963). For statutory authorization see note 80 supra.
84 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (Supp. 1963).
85 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (Supp. 1963).
86 Immigration and Nationality Act § 106, 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)
(Supp. IV, 1959-62). See also Gordon, Judicial Review of Immigration Decisions, 37
INTERPRETER RELEAsES 289 (1960); Note, Deportation and Exclusion, 71 YALE L.J. 760
(1962).
87 Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(b), 66 Stat. 209 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)
(1958).
88 Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
89 Matter of C-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 611 (1960); Matter of C-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 276 (1959).
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tion was unqualifiedly upheld in the early court decisions,90 which relied
on a statutory prohibition against the re-entry of an alien who had been
deported pursuant to law unless he had obtained the Attorney General's
permission to return.91 One court observed that a deportee had no right
to re-enter the United States in violation of the immigration laws even
if it were assumed that the deportation was wrong.9 2 Another court found
that the prior deportation had fixed the law of the case.93 While later
decisions have adhered to this proposition, they have added a caveat
that the initial deportation may be challenged if it is shown to have
involved a "gross miscarriage of justice." 94
No case has elaborated what would be considered a "gross miscarriage
of justice" for this purpose or actually applied the concept to nullify a
prior deportation. Debatable statutory constructions or evaluations of
evidence apparently would not suffice for this purpose. A flagrantly im-
proper statutory construction, an obviously unsubstantial evidentiary
base, or a manifest denial of due process, on the other hand, might
persuade a court to intervene. In any event, in assessing alleged manifest
injustice, the courts will consider the amount of time that the deportee
has permitted to elapse before contesting the deportation. 5 The trend
of adjudication thus far appears to point in the direction of expanded
judicial inquiry in this area. 96 A 1961 enactment, however, precludes
judicial review of an order of deportation or of exclusion if the alien
has departed the United States after the issuance of the order.97 While
this statute is not directly concerned with administrative re-examination,
90 United States ex rel. Bartsch v. Watkins, 175 F2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1949); Daska-
loft v. Zurbrick, 103 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1939); United States ex rel. Koehler v. Corsi,
60 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1932).
91 Now codified in Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(17), 66 Stat. 183 (1952),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17) (1958).
92 United States ex rel. Bartsch v. Watkins, 175 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1949).
93 United States ex rel. Koehler v. Corsi, 60 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1932).
94 DeSouza v. Barber, 263 F.2d 470 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 989 (1959); United
States ex rel. Rubio v. Jordan, 190 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1951); United States ex rel.
Steffner v. Carmichael, 183 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 829 (1950); Spinella
v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
95 Mesina v. Rosenberg, 278 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1960) (long period of acquiescence
barred challenge); DeSouza v. Barber, 263 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 989 (1959) (same, daim of lack of due process).
96 See McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1960). In Marcello v. Kennedy,
194 F. Supp. 748 (D.D.C. 1961), afJ'd on other grounds, 312 F.2d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 933 (1963), the district court entertained a challenge to the manner
in which a deportation order had been executed but found the challenge unsub-
stantiated.
97 Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(c), 75 Stat. 653 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c)
(Supp. IV, 1959-62).
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it may be relevant in appraising the legislative intent. In any event, it
may not be adequate cause for assault on the original decision that the
controlling rule has been changed by subsequent judicial decisions, or
by statute.98
On the opposite side of the coin, if deportation proceedings have been
brought against an alien and have been dismissed by the administrative
authorities, can new deportation proceedings later be brought against
the same alien? This is a question which has had surprisingly little
consideration, probably because new proceedings are rarely brought
after one effort has failed.
It is settled that deportation proceedings do not impose criminal
punishment,99 and the inhibition against double jeopardy consequently
does not apply. It seems equally obvious that dismissal of a deportation
proceeding does not confer eternal absolution which shields the alien
from a later proceeding based on new, or different, misconduct or upon
a new statutory ground. A debatable issue may arise, however, when a
new deportation proceeding is brought on the same charge, if the former
proceeding was dismissed after full consideration because the evidence
was inadequate or because of procedural irregularity.
An illustration of such multiple consideration occurred in the famous
Bridges case. In 1938, a deportation charge that Bridges was then a
member of the Communist Party was dismissed by a special examiner.
In 1940, after amendment of the statute to reach past membership in the
Communist Party, new deportation proceedings were brought before a
different special examiner predicated on a charge that Bridges had been
a member of the Communist Party. This time deportation was ordered,
but the order was vacated by the Supreme Court, principally for pro-
cedural errors. 100 The Court did not discuss the applicability of res
judicata, although the lower court decisions it reversed had found that
res judicata did not bar the second deportation proceeding. 101 In 1945,
Bridges was naturalized without objection and in 1949 he was prosecuted
for falsely denying in the naturalization proceeding that he was a mem-
ber of the Communist Party. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction on this charge and specifically held
98 United States ex rel. Steffner v. Carmichael, 183 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 829 (1950) (subsequent Supreme Court decision); Matter of R-, 4 I. & N. Dec.
173 (1950) (same); Matter of P-, 3 I. 9- N. Dec. 818 (1949) (same); Matter of R-,
3 I. & N. Dec. 605 (1949) (same).
99 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
100 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
101 Bridges v. Wixon, 144 F.2d 927, 936 (9th Cir. 1944); Ex parte Bridges, 49 F.
Supp. 292 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
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that the 1938 dismissal of the deportation proceeding was not res judicata
nor did it estop the criminal prosecution. The court reasoned that res
judicata applied only to judicial decisions and did not bar reconsidera-
tion of the same matter by an administrative agency or a court.
102
This conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court on another ground,
and the majority did not discuss res judicata.1 3 The minority opinion
of Mr. Justice Reed, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Mr. Justice
Minton, favored upholding the conviction and found it not foreclosed
by res judicata, since there "has been no court holding that Bridges has
not been a Communist."' 04 Even the minority thus was concerned at
most with the binding effect of an administrative decision in a subsequent
criminal proceeding.
In neither of its two Bridges decisions, then, did the Supreme Court
grapple directly with the issue we are considering. The only other deci-
sion that may be relevant involved a situation where a court had found
the evidence insufficient to support a deportation order but had held the
case in abeyance for several years to permit further investigation. When
such evidence was not forthcoming it invalidated the deportation order.
Some years later new deportation proceedings were brought, but the
court found them precluded by the prior judicial determination. 10 5 This
holding actually depended, however, on the asserted conclusiveness of a
judicial, rather than an administrative, order.
The finality of an administrative vindication, and its possible pre-
clusion of further deportation proceedings on the same issue, thus has
never been established. Eventually the courts may be persuaded to re-
quire some measure of res judicata, particularly if the statute remains
silent. But a new hearing promptly conducted to remedy an inadequacy
of evidence or a procedural defect might in some instances resemble a
new trial in a judicial proceeding, which never has been subject to res
judicata.
4. Determination of a Claim to United States Citizenship
In recent years there has been considerable discussion of the determina-
tion of claims to United States citizenship. Underlying this discussion is
the conviction that American citizenship is a priceless boon, and that
citizenship rights must be given the most scrupulous protection.10 6 This
102 Bridges v. United States, 199 F.2d 811, 826 (9th Cir. 1952).
103 Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953).
104 Id. at 228, 234.
105 Anselmo v. Hardin, 253 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1958).
106 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 129 (1958); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 78 (1958) (dissenting opinion); Barber v.
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generous attitude has led to the development of special rules and extra
precautions to shield the citizenship claimant.
It is clear that an administrative finding that a person involved in an
exclusion or deportation proceeding is not an American citizen has no
conclusive effect. In establishing their jurisdiction to order exclusion or
deportation, the administrative authorities necessarily determine whether
the person before them is a citizen.107 But the administrative order can
be questioned through the normal channels of judicial review on a claim
of error of law or procedure or because of a lack of substantial evi-
dence.108 And a court reviewing a deportation order will itself conduct
a de novo inquiry of a nonfrivolous claim to United States citizenship.10 9
Moreover, whether he is within" 0 or without"' the United States, a
citizenship claimant who has been denied a right or privilege as an
American citizen can bring a declaratory judgment suit to vindicate his
claim. In such a declaratory judgment suit also, the court disregards the
administrative determination, and proceeds de novo."2
An administrative ruling that a person is an American citizen may
take several forms, and in its context each of these may involve varying
considerations. The person affected frequently has relied on such a
determination for many years. In effect, the administrative determination
has given him the indicia of citizenship of which he should not lightly
be divested. While the courts never have applied any principle of res
judicata, they have required some deference to the administrative ruling.
To some extent the weight to be attached to the ruling may depend
upon the formality of the proceeding and the reliance placed upon it.
The most obvious situation, perhaps, occurs when a person is admitted
Gonzalez, 347 U.S. 637 (1954); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 158-59
(1943); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920).
107 United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904); Marks v. Esperdy, 315 F.2d 673
(2d Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 375 U.S. 810 (1963); Hernandez-Avila v. Boyd, 294 F.2d
373 (9th Cir. 1961); United States ex rel. Lapides v. Watkins, 165 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir.
1948).
108 Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673 (1912); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253
(1905).
109 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922); Frank v. Rogers, 253 F.2d 889 (D.C.
Cir. 1958). The cases cited in note 108 supra, rejected such a right to a de novo judicial
inquiry in a review of an exclusion, as distinguished from a deportation order. But cf.
United States ex rel. Chu Leung v. Shaughnessy, 176 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1949); Lee Fong
Fook v. Wixon, 170 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1948); Carmichael v. Delany, 170 F.2d 239 (9th
Cir. 1948); United States ex rel. Medeiros v. Watkins, 166 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1948).
'10 Immigration and Nationality Act § 360, 66 Stat. 273 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (1958).
II' Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962).
112 Wong Wing Foo v. McGrath, 196 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1952); Mah Ying Og v.
McGrath, 187 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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to the United States as a citizen. Here we encounter a variation of the
theme we have previously explored, for if he was actually an alien, his
admission was defective and theoretically is open to assault at any time.
Yet the recognition of the citizenship claim obviously has introduced an
additional factor.
Some earlier cases declared that previous allowance by immigration
officers of admission as a citizen was entitled to little weight and could
be disregarded if the authorities later found the entrant not to be a
citizen. 113 More recent cases, however, have concluded that such a ruling
has prima fade effect which can be overcome only by a dear, unequivocal
and convincing showing that it was induced by fraud, or error of fact
or of law.114 The current attitude is illustrated by the following observa-
tions:
Appellant acted in reliance on the board decision which re-
sulted, as he was expected to do. The consequences for him are
as grave as if that decision had been rendered by a court of
law. . . . [T]he fact that past board proceedings may have been
informal and summary does not warrant corrective procedures
which fail to take account of the human values which have
attached. If the Government is to turn the clock back after all
these years, it should meet a standard of proof which is not
meagre. 115
The court here was speaking of an adjudicative ruling by a board of
special inquiry, and its comments might not apply equally to a simple
admission to the United States which did not entail a formal or con-
sidered adjudication. Moreover, it did not rule in terms of res judicata
or estoppel, but, rather, spoke of the burden of disproof, conceding that
the administrative ruling could be overcome by a convincing showing
of fraud or error. Yet its holding does attach to admission to the United
States as a citizen a degree of finality not accorded to admission as an
alien.
A second type of administrative determination of American citizen-
ship is the issuance by federal authorities of a document attesting to
citizenship status such as a passport or a certificate of citizenship or of
identity. Such a document usually is granted pursuant to statutory
authority. It does not award citizenship, but recognizes that it exists and
ordinarily is issued upon application and without a formal hearing.
118 Lum Mon Sing v. United States, 124 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1941); In re Wing, 124
F. Supp. 492 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
'14 Lew Moon Cheung v. Rogers, 272 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1959); Lee Hon Lung v.
Dulles, 261 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1958); cf. Montana v. Rogers, 278 F.2d 68 (7th Cir.
1960), aff'd on other grounds, 366 U.S. 308 (1961).
115 Lee Hon Lung v. Dulles, supra note 114, at 724.
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The authorities appear to accord little weight to a passport, finding
that the holder of such a document may be excluded if at the time of
entry he is found not to be a citizen.116 Other cases have dealt similarly
with certificates of identity as citizens presented by applicants for entry.11 7
Yet the Third Circuit has ruled that a letter from the Immigration Ser-
vice expressing the view that a person in the United States is a citizen
establishes a prima facie claim to citizenship, which can be dislodged
only by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence. 118 That decision
appears to attach excessive weight to a mere letter but the principle it
formulates may not be fully applicable in the entry cases since the
statute specifically requires the exclusion or expulsion of those found
inadmissible.
Another type of document issued by the immigration authorities is
a certificate of citizenship, which attests that the applicant has acquired
United States citizenship derivatively through a parent.119 The statute
directs that such a certificate "shall have the same effect in all courts,
tribunals, or public offices of the United States" as a naturalization
certificate issued by a court.120 The statute also authorizes, without time
limitation, an administrative proceeding to cancel such a certificate if
it was illegally or fraudulently obtained.121 These statutory prescriptions
would appear to indicate that such an unrevoked certificate of citizen-
ship must be accorded at least prima facie effect. But one court has found
that a person could not resist deportation on the basis of unrevoked
certificates of citizenship predicated on his alleged United States citizen-
ship and issued to six of his children. 122 Although the case may be dis-
tinguishable from what appears the intended reach of the statute since
the certificates were not issued to the complaining party himself, the
court's reasoning is sweeping and concludes that the certificate falls if
the evidence on which it was based is discredited. Another court found
a criminal prosecution maintainable against the holder of an unrevoked
116 Louie Hoy Gay v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1957); Ng Yip Yee v. Barber,
210 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 988 (1954); Wah v. Shaughnessy,
190 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1951).
117 Wong Kwok Sui v. Boyd, 285 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1960); United States ex rel.
Lapides v. Watkins, 165 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1948). See also Chin Kai Su v. Dulles, 157
F. Supp. 190 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
118 Delmore v. Brownell, 236 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1956).
119 Immigration and Nationality Act § 341, 66 Stat. 263 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1452 (1958).
120 Immigration and Nationality Act § 332(e), 66 Stat. 252 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1443(e)
(1958).
'21 Immigration and Nationality Act § 342, 66 Stat. 263 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1453 (1958).
The administrative procedure for such cancellations is prescribed in 8 C.F.R. § 342.1
(1958).
122 Reyes v. Neelly, 264 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1959).
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certificate of citizenship for fraud in its procurement. 123 Again, the facts
are distinguishable, but the court declared that the certificate was open
to collateral attack and that the statutory cancellation procedure was
discretionary, not mandatory.
These expressions seem out of line with the current weight of authority
in related areas. The better view would appear to be that such a certifi-
cate of citizenship is entitled at least to prima facie effect. Indeed, the
statutory provisions we have mentioned may require that the certificate
be recognized unless revoked. The Attorney General has ruled that an
unrevoked certificate of citizenship must be honored by the officers of the
State Department and other government agencies. 124 The Attorney
General's opinion did not deal directly with the possibility that such an
unrevoked certificate might be disregarded in exclusion or deportation
proceedings, which can be directed only against aliens. The thrust of
his opinion, however, and the language of the statute, appear to favor
regard for the certificate.
A third type of citizenship determination stems from certifications of
birth issued by state authorities. The effect given to such documents
depends to some extent on state law and on the nature of the record.
Ordinarily, a contemporaneous record of birth in the United States will
be accepted as almost conclusive of an issue involving the acquisition of
United States citizenship.125 Most states, however, also make provision
for the recording of delayed (nunc pro tunc) birth certificates, often in a
court proceeding. Such certificates at most are entitled to prima facie
effect and will be given little weight if the record discloses that they were
based on tenuous evidence. 126
II. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
To some extent our previous discussion has concerned the possibility
of estoppel. However, the authorities generally have not explored this
concept. But, when directly confronted by a plea of estoppel, the courts
usually have declared that the United States cannot be estopped by a
prior determination of one of its officers.
We turn now to another aspect of estoppel. Is the Government subject
to an equitable estoppel when a person's disadvantageous actions re-
123 United States v. Chin Doong Art, 180 F. Supp. 446 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). See also Lem
v. Rogers, 180 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
124 In re Flegenheimer, 41 Ops. Arr'y GFN. No. 79 (1960).
125 Liacakos v. Kennedy, 195 F. Supp. 630 (D.D.C. 1961).
126 Louie Hoy Gay v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1957); Casares-Moreno v. United
States, 226 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1955); Mah Toi v. Brownell, 219 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 823 (1956).
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suited from misrepresentation or other improper conduct of a govern-
ment officer?
Modem jurisprudence exhorts the government to observe the highest
precepts of rectitude in dealing with its citizens. At the same time, there
is a strong feeling that the actions of a single officer should not be per-
mitted to override legislative programs or policies that can be formulated
only by Congress. As between these competing considerations, the trend
of current decisions appears to reflect that the impulse for fair dealing
usually will prevail in immigration and nationality matters.127 In any
event, of course, an equitable estoppel would not arise in the case of an
illegal resident merely because of sympathetic considerations, based on
long residence and established family ties, when no improper or mis-
leading official action is charged.128
In Montana v. Kennedy 29 the estoppel issue was squarely presented
by a citizenship claimant who asserted that, although he actually was
born in Italy in 1906, the Government should be estopped from denying
that he was born in the United States because his birth in this country
was prevented by the improper action of an American consul in refusing
an American passport to his pregnant mother. The Supreme Court ex-
plicity avoided direct consideration of the estoppel issue, finding that
the claimant's mother had not needed a passport to return to the Unifed
States and that there had been no persuasive showing of improper action
by the consul.
There were obvious difficulties in finding that Montana had acquired
United States citizenship under a constitutional and statutory mandate
restricting this title to persons actually born in the United States. In
McLeod v. Peterson,180 however, the court was able to overcome a
similar obstacle. There an alien sought suspension of deportation. A
prerequisite for such suspension was continuous physical presence in
the United States during a specified period but the applicant had been
advised by immigration officers to leave the United States after a pre-
vious application for suspension of deportation had erroneously been
denied. In finding that the applicant had complied with the requirement
of continuous physical presence, the court did not specifically refer to
estoppel, but remarked:
127 See McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960); In re Vacontios' Petition,
155 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Berger, Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. CR1.
L. REv. 680 (1954). See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 157, 158 (1963),
which assumes the Government can be estopped but finds no basis for estoppel in the
facts.
128 Kalatjis v. Rosenberg, 305 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1962).
129 366 U.S. 308 (1961).
180 283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960).
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To yield to this argument would be to become a party to a
"bootstrap" operation by means of which officers of the United
States seek to turn their own error, however innocent, into a
bar to the assertion of a right by the victim of this very error.131
Another facet of this problem is presented in United States v. Anas-
tasio,132 which refused denaturalization premised on an antecedent fraud
in a registry proceeding. The court found that the Government was "in
an inequitable position," since Anastasio had been naturalized on the
basis of honorable military service and apparently could have obtained
a new registry certificate currently. It declared that in a denaturalization
suit the Government must cut square corners, thus reversing its position
in the usual expressions of the "square corners" aphorism. Estoppel was
not mentioned, but the court relied heavily on the fact that the Govern-
ment's files at the time of naturalization contained evidence of the fraud,
although this information was not actually known to the examiner.
Straining to attain a desirable result, the court ruled, somewhat question-
ably, that the Government was not defrauded. The decision thus rests on
an evaluation of fraud rather than of estoppel.
Other rulings have been regarded as concerned with estoppel, but they
too appear to rest on different considerations. Thus, a leading treatise 33
cites Moser v. United States'34 as an instance of a situation in which the
Government can be estopped. Moser had applied for relief from military
service in this country and thus was deemed to have forfeited his right
to apply for American citizenship. He claimed to have acted in reliance
on advice from his country's embassy, which in turn had been guided by
the Department of State. The Supreme Court ruled that the statute
accorded Moser a choice between citizenship benefits and exemption
from military service and that the official misinformation had denied him
the opportunity to make a free choice. Although there are some over-
tones of estoppel, the decision appears to have dealt with whether the
individual had made a voluntary choice, rather than with an estoppel
against the Government. This evaluation seems confirmed by the subse-
quent rulings of the lower courts, most of which have decided that a free
choice was made in the cases before them.13
131 Id. at 187.
132 226 F.2d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956).
133 2 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE Lw TREATISE § 17.02, at 501 (1958).
134 341 U.S. 41 (1951).
135 See Cebalos v. Shaughnessy, 352 U.S. 599 (1957); Machado v. McGrath, 193 F.2d
706 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 948 (1951); Matter of Planas, 152 F. Supp.
456 (D.N.J. 1957); Petition of Sally, 151 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Petition of
Kutay, 121 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Petition of Berini, 112 F. Supp. 837 (E.D.N.Y.
1953); Hichino Uyeno v. Acheson, 96 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Wash. 1951) (since Govern-
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Another situation in which some commentators have said the Govern-
ment can be estopped arises from the alleged loss of United States citizen-
ship. In contrast to Montana, which involved the initial acquisition of
citizenship, these cases involve voluntary action to shed an established
status. They typically arise when the citizen is alleged to have lost his
status by failing to come to the United States within a prescribed time
or by performing an act of expatriation. He asserts that his delay in
returning was caused by the failure or refusal of the American consul to
issue the necessary documents'8 6 or that the affirmative act of expatria-
tion resulted from the consul's misinformation that he was not an
American citizen. 137 Such pleas, if substantiated, have averted a finding
that citizenship was lost but the decisions do not appear to have been
motivated by a concept of estoppel. Rather, they have proceeded on a
finding that the citizen had not voluntarily relinquished his citizen-
ship status and had substantially complied with the conditions for its
retention. Although the courts in these cases sometimes have spoken in
terms of estoppel, it seems clear that they actually were concerned with
the voluntary action which is an essential ingredient of expatriation.18
ment prevented return, it is not in position to say that failure to return caused loss
of citizenship). See, however, dictum in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
157-58 (1963), which cites Moser in stating the United States may be estopped, and
thus appears to support Professor Davis' reading of Moser.
136 Lee Wing Hong v. Dulles, 214 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1954) (same, "the weight of
authority, admittedly not too impressive, sustains the conclusion'); Moldoveanu v.
Dulles, 168 F. Supp. 1, 7 (E.D. Mich. 1958) ('simple justice requires that the defense of
noncompliance be unavailable to Government when its own restraint induced the
failure to return.'); Lee Hong v. Acheson, 110 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Cal. 1953) (same, had
substantially complied with statute); Lee Bang Hong v. Acheson, 110 F. Supp. 48
(D. Haw. 1951) (failure to return before 16th birthday caused by consul's failure to
process application for passport); Repetto v. Acheson, 94 F. Supp. 623 (N.D. Cal. 1950)
(same, return "prevented through no fault of her own"); Matter of S-, 8 I. & N. Dec.
226 (1958) (same, did not return because of circumstances beyond control). See also
Lee You Fee v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 355
U.S. 61 (1957) (since application to return was made after citizenship was lost, there
was no occasion to consider whether Government was estopped); United States ex rel.
Lapides v. Watkins, 165 F.2d 1017, 1019 (2d Cir. 1948) (no estoppel against Government
even though consul allegedly induced belief time to return was extended).
187 Podea v. Acheson, 179 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1950) (not expatriated by foreign military
service, since his situation resulted from erroneous advice of State Department and
actions not voluntary); DiGirolamo v. Acheson, 101 F. Supp. 380 (D.D.C. 1951) (same);
Matter of P-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 362 (1961) (same); Matter of G---, 9 I. & N. Dec. 64 (1960)
(same, regarded as constructively present in U.S.). Of interest in this connection are
the rulings that a person who was unaware of his claim to United States citizenship
did not voluntarily relinquish such citizenship by taking oath of allegiance to a
foreign country or by other acts of expatriation. Rogers v. Patokoski, 271 F.2d 858
(9th Cir. 1959); Matter of C- S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 670 (A.G. 1962); Matter of C- A-,
9 I. & N. Dec. 482 (1961).
138 Among the numerous decisions underscoring the need for voluntariness in
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Mention should also be made of Ackermann v. United States,39 which
was an effort to reopen a denaturalization judgment from which the
defendant had not appealed when later adjudications indicated that such
an appeal would have been successful. The decision not to appeal was
said to have been influenced by the advice of an immigration official at
a time when Ackermann was in detention as an alien enemy during
World War II. Reopening was refused on the ground that there had
been a considered choice not to appeal. Since the immigration officer
was not in a fiduciary relationship and had not been guilty of misrep-
resentation or undue influence, the Court found no basis for relief. 40
Thus, while there has been some talk of equitable estoppel against
the Government in immigration and nationality matters, the issue sel-
dom has been directly adjudicated. The cases do demonstrate, however,
that the prevailing judicial climate dearly is opposed to any unfairness
in the actions of government officers. Therefore, it is not inconceivable
that under appropriate circumstances equitable estoppel may be success-
fully urged against the Government.
III. EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DETERMINATION IN SUBSEQUENT
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
The discussion to this point has been concerned primarily with the
effect of administrative actions. It turns now to the effect of judicial
rulings. Certain types of court decisions conclude the administrative
process. A definitive interpretation of a statute, for instance, particularly
by a court of last resort, is controlling. Sanctions attach to disobedience
to the direct command of a court in a specific case. Our attention is
directed rather to judicial determinations which do not touch the ad-
ministrative process directly but determine issues which arise in a sub-
sequent administrative proceeding. Such determinations to some extent
appear to summon the principle of collateral estoppel, under which a
court's final adjudication of an issue precludes relitigation of the same
issue between the same parties in another lawsuit.141 Complications are
introduced, however, by the differences between the judicial and the
expatriation are Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S.
299 (1915). Such voluntariness results from the objective wish to perform the ex-
patriating act, rather than a subjective desire to cast off American citizenship. Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958); Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
139 340 U.S. 193 (1950).
140 Cf. later explanation of the Ackermann case in Polites v. United States, 364 U.S.
426, 431-33 (1960).
141 See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); REsTATEmENT, JUDGMENTS INTRO-
ductory Note to ch. 3, at 159, § 45, comment c, § 68 (1942); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by
Judgment, 56 Htv. L. Rxv. 1 (1942).
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administrative process, and by the difficulty sometimes encountered in
deciding whether there is identity in parties and issues.
1. Citizenship Claims
A direct determination, in a suit for declaratory judgment, that a
party is an American citizen, is conclusive for all purposes unless and
until it is rescinded by the court. 142 A collateral finding, in a litigation
dealing also with other issues, by a court that a person is an American
citizen, may be conclusive of subsequent administrative determinations
if it appears that the parties are the same and that the court resolved the
issue of citizenship. 14 But if the court did not specifically adjudicate
the title to American citizenship or if there is not an identity of parties
before the court and the administrative authorities, the court's ruling
will have no effect on the subsequent consideration of the citizenship
issue.144
A judicial determination unfavorable to a citizenship claimant, on the
other hand, may also be deemed to be conclusive. Dismissal on the merits
in a suit for declaratory judgment of citizenship may preclude a new
suit to obtain such a declaration, 145 and may collaterally estop a claim
of citizenship in a subsequent deportation proceeding.146 But no case
has arisen collaterally estopping a claim of citizenship because of a
judicial determination adverse to the claim made in an earlier litigation
dealing with other issues. Such an estoppel apparently would be limited
by the judicial solicitude for citizenship claims and by the caution which
must be exercised to avoid barring or expelling a citizen from the United
States.
142 See Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez, 862 U.S. 384 (1960), remanding to ascertain
whether citizenship was adjudicated in a prior criminal prosecution. Upon such
remand, it was found that there had been no such finding. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 872 U.S. 144 (1963). Cf. Ah How v. United States, 193 U.S. 65 (1904); Ex
parte Mac Fock, 207 Fed. 696 (W.D. Wash. 1913), holding that a Chinese person hold-
ing a certificate from a United States Commissioner showing that he was discharged
from custody as a citizen, nevertheless could be deported as an alien. Cf. Leung Jun
v. United States, 171 Fed. 413 (2d Cir. 1909), finding such a discharge res judicata
when the certificate showed it was issued by the Commissioner on the basis of evidence
produced before him at a hearing.
143 See Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez, 362 U.S. 884 (1960).
144 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 872 U.S. 144 (1963).
145 Leung Gim v. Brownell, 238 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1956) (dismissed for lack of juris-
diction); Ma Chuck Moon v. Dulles, 237 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1956) (dismissed for failure
to sustain burden of proof).
146 Matter of W- K- W-, 9 1. & N. Dec. 235 (1961); Matter of J- J-, 9 I. & N.
Dec. 320 (1961). Cf. Matter of H-, 7 I. 8- N. Dec. 407 (1957), apparently overruled but
not mentioned in above cases. If dismissal is not on the merits, the issue may be raised
in later judicial or administrative proceedings. Fujii v. Dulles, 259 F.2d 866 (9th Cir.
1958); Matter of T-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 244 (1959).
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It is unlikely, in any event, that the rules of estoppel will be applied to
shut off the presentation of a citizenship claim that may be valid. While
a prior judicial ruling of the underlying facts ordinarily will not be re-
examined in subsequent proceedings, it seems likely that the citizenship
claimant can urge legal concepts favoring the citizenship claim but not
urged in the prior proceeding. (This is probably so even if the new legal
grounds developed from decisions rendered subsequent to the prior
proceeding to which the claimant was a party.) And if the denial of
opportunity to urge a citizenship claim appears inequitable, the courts
unquestionably would require that such opportunity be given.
2. Alienage and Other Collateral Questions
In a few instances a court's prior decision on an issue has been urged
as a collateral estoppel for presentation of like issues in a deportation
proceeding. For instance, the Government must establish that the re-
spondent in a deportation proceeding is an alien 141 and, since an alien
by definition is a person who is not a citizen or national of the United
States,148 a direct court holding that a person is not a citizen may simplify
the Government's case in establishing that he is an alien.149 Or, if the
court has specifically ruled that a person is an alien, as in a criminal
prosecution for unlawful entry or re-entry as an alien, its decision may
establish that fact for the purposes of a deportation proceeding.150
When a deportation charge is premised on fraud in obtaining a visa
or in entry, a criminal conviction for the same charge may be binding
in the deportation proceeding' 51 if the criminal charge is identical with
that in the deportation proceeding. 152 But, on the other hand, state court
conviction as a narcotics addict did not itself support a deportation charge
for drug addiction, since the parties were different and the state and
federal statutes did not relate to identical offenses. 15 Similarly indecisive
have been efforts to rely on criminal convictions or denaturalization
judgments predicated on a defendant's Communist Party membership
as establishing such membership for the purposes of a deportation pro-
'47 Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923); McNeil v. Kennedy, 298 F.2d 323 (D.C.
Cir. 1962); Wong Kwok Sui v. Boyd, 285 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1960).
148 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(3), 66 Stat. 166 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(3) (1958).
149 See note 146 supra.
150 United States v. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
151 Matter of Z-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 708 (1954).
152 Matter of Marinho, 10 1. & N. Dec. (I.D. 1273, 1963).
153 Matter of K- C- B-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 374 (1954).
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ceeding.154 One court found that since the defendant had not testified
in the earlier denaturalization case and now wanted the opportunity to
testify, application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel would be unfair,
particularly since later Supreme Court decisions had formulated a new
definition of meaningful Communist Party membership. 55 Moreover, the
court declared that the refusal to permit respondent in the deportation
proceeding to testify concerning his alleged Communist Party member-
ship denied him the full hearing assured by the statute. Generally it
appears the impact of collateral estoppel in deportation hearings will be
slight and will be limited to situations in which an issue has been clearly
and necessarily resolved by a court, and in which resort to this doctrine
will not be inequitable.
3. Conviction of Crime as Basis for Deportation
The statute prescribes deportation for certain aliens who have been
convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. 5 6 In many such situations
the affected aliens have sought to establish in the deportation proceeding
that they were not guilty of the crime of which they were convicted, that
the criminal proceedings were defective or incomplete, or that the crime
for which they were convicted did not involve moral turpitude.
Since the premise of deportation in such cases is a conviction for crime,
it is settled that the immigration authorities cannot ordinarily be called
upon to retry the criminal case or to pass upon a plea that the alien
actually was not guilty of the crime for which he was convicted.157 Nor
can they examine the particular circumstances to determine if turpitude
actually was involved. 58 The official record of conviction settles the issues
of guilt and of the precise crime for which the conviction occurred.159
The turpitude of the offense is assessed by its inherent nature rather than
by the particular circumstances. 160 But a convicted alien can contend
154 Title v. INS, 322 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1963), which overruled Matter of G-, 8
I. & N. Dec. 577 (1960).
155 Id. See Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469 (1963); Rowoldt v. Perfetto,
355 U.S. 115 (1957).
156 Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(4), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(4) (1953).
157 United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Savoretti, 200 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1952); Mercer
v. Lence, 96 F.2d 122 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 611 (1938); United States
ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 Fed. 860 (2d Cir. 1914).
158 United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1939); Tillinghast v.
Edmead, 31 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1929).
159 United States ex rel. Zaffarano v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1933).
160 Ibid.; Ablett v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States ex rel.
Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1939); United States ex rel. Robinson v. Day,
51 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1931).
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that the conviction was not for a crime involving moral turpitude, 61
that the conviction must be disregarded because it is void on its face,16 2
or because it was a conviction in absentia, 63 or because the offense to
which it relates was not actually a crime, 64 or because the conviction
was invalid for failure to observe constitutional requirements. 165 And he
can assert that there actually was no conviction,166 or that the conviction
was not final, since only a final conviction may incur deportability under
this phase of the statute.167
These efforts to limit the effect of a c:riminal conviction do not involve
res judicata or estoppel. In effect, they seek to inquire whether the
conditions prescribed by the statute have been met: They measure com-
pliance with statutory prerequisites rather than the binding effect of
adjudications.
IV. EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DETERMINATION IN SUBSEQUENT
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING
To some extent immigration and nationality problems may be resolved
by the courts in proceedings for judicial review, for declaratory judg-
ments, for naturalization and denaturalization and in criminal prosecu-
161 United States ex rel. Freislinger v. Smith, 41 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1930); Wilson
v. Carr, 41 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1930).
162 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
163 Ex Parte Koerner, 176 Fed. 478 (E.D. Wash. 1909); Ex parte Watchorn, 160 Fed.
1014 (S.D.N.Y., 1908); 22 C.F.R. §§ 42.91(a)(9)(v), 41.91(a)(9)(iv) (1961); cf. Weinbrand
v. Prentis, 4 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1925) (given notice and opportunity to be present);
Matter of V- D- B-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 608 (1960) (same, appeared later, paid fine, took
no appeal).
164 Ex Parte Isojoki, 222 Fed. 151 (N.D. Cal. 1915); Matter of C-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 867
(1945); 22 C.F.R. §§ 42.91(a)(9)(i), 41.91(a)(9)(i) (1961). Thus juvenile delinquency,
prosecuted as such, is not regarded as a crime. Matter of T-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 835
(1955); Matter of C- M-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 327 (1953). However, the result is different
if the offender is prosecuted as an adult. United States ex rel. Circella v. Sahli, 216
F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955); ef. Hernandez-Valensuela v.
Rosenberg, 304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962) (Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 5010(b) (1952)); Tutrone v. Shaughnessy, 160 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (court found
he would be treated as a juvenile under modem standards). Moreover, the state
designation of the information as an "offense," rather than a crime, will not neces-
sarily be controlling, since a uniform federal standard is contemplated. Babouris v.
Esperdy, 269 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1959) (soliciting men to commit crime against nature).
165 United States ex -el. Durante v. Holton, 228 F.2d 827 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 963 (1956); United States ex rel. Marino v. Holton, 227 F.2d 886 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1955).
166 A court martial conviction by American military forces in a foreign country is
deemed not a conviction for this purpose. Gubbels v. Hoy, 261 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1958).
167 Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955). However, a conviction followed by a sus-
pended sentence is deemed a final conviction for this purpose. Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d
825 (9th Cir. 1959).
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tions. A discussion of the impact of concepts of finality on the administra-
tive process, therefore, would not be complete without a brief considera-
tion of the treatment of similar concepts in such judicial proceedings.
1. Judgment in Proceeding for Judicial Review
Judicial review of exclusion and deportation orders developed, in the
absence of direct statutory authorization for such review, through the
writ of habeas corpus, which challenged the legality of the detention.168
After enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946,169 an
additional remedy emerged through a proceeding for declaratory review
and injunction. 170 In 1961, Congress codified the right to statutory re-
view, providing that final deportation orders could be questioned only
by a direct review in an appropriate United States Court of Appeals' 7'
and that exclusion orders could be challenged only through habeas cor-
pus.' 7 2 The right to habeas corpus also was preserved for aliens in custody
under deportation orders. 173
To the extent that judicial review has been sought through habeas
corpus, the traditional judicial attitude toward that writ has repulsed
any concept of finality for a decision denying habeas corpus relief. An
unsuccessful habeas corpus petition never has prevented the petitioner
from bringing new habeas corpus proceedings. 7 4 Indeed, in some in-
stances successive habeas corpus writs have been aimed at the same
administrative order, and occasionally a fourth or fifth habeas corpus
writ has been successful.' 7 5 However, the courts are required to give
controlling weight to the prior adjudication unless a new ground for
relief is presented and unless they are satisfied that the ends of justice
will be served by further inquiry. 76
This picture has changed somewhat with the development of review
168 Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
169 Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958).
170 Ceballos v. Shaughnessy, 352 U.S. 599 (1957) (denial of discretionary relief);
Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956) (exclusion order); Shaughnessy v.
Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955) (deportation order).
171 Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(a), 66 Stat. 175 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1105
(1958), as amended, 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (Supp. IV, 1963). The orbit
of the "final deportation orders" reviewable under this statute has been interpreted
broadly by the Supreme Court in Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963).
172 Sec. 106(b).
173 Sec. 106(a)(9).
174 The applicable rules are reviewed and restated, with increased emphasis on
liberality in entertaining new writs, in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
175 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Price v. Johnston,
334 U.S. 266 (1948).
176 Price v. Johnston, supra note 175; Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239
(1924); 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1959). Cf. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
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by declaratory judgment and injunction. Although it has been said that
the new remedies affect only the form of the action and not the scope
of review,"'7 the weight of authority has tended to apply the principles
of res judicata to bar a second review of an order already upheld in a
prior review proceeding."' 8 Review was not deemed, however, precluded
in regard to causes of action not previously adjudicated, such as deter-
minations relating to discretionary relief' 9 and the fixing of a place of
deportation. 8 0 And experience has shown that courts do not apply the
principle of res judicata rigidly in such circumstances, where the new
proceeding advances substantial constitutional claims or makes a sub-
stantial showing of manifest injustice.'8 '
The 1961 statute codifying a right to judicial review was designed to
minimize multiple attacks on deportation and exclusion orders. It com-
manded that every petition for habeas corpus or for review addressed
to an exclusion or deportation order state whether and in what partic-
ulars the order was upheld in any prior judicial proceeding. 8 2 No such
petition for review or for habeas corpus may be entertained if the order
was previously upheld, unless it presents new grounds not formerly
available or shows that the prior remedy was inadequate or ineffective. 83
A final court decision sustaining a challenge to a deportation order in
a habeas corpus or review proceeding usually ends the matter. It is con-
ceivable, however, that the alien may be subject to further proceedings,
particularly if new or different deportation charges are pressed. If the
basis for invalidating the administrative order was a remediable defect
in proof or procedure, the court may remand the case for further ad-
ministrative consideration. 8 4 If it vacates the order without reservation,
it still may be possible for the administrative authorities to bring new
proceedings untainted by the prior defect.'8 5
177 Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 183, 186 (1956); Frank v. Rogers, 253
F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1958); United States ex rel. Brzovich v. Holton, 222 F.2d 840 (7th
Cir. 1955). Cf. Fugiani v. Barber, 261 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1958) (dissenting opinion).
178 Cruz-Sanchez v. Robinson, 249 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1957); Estevez v. Nabers, 219
F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1955); Spinella v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
179 Williams v. Sahli, 292 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 977 (1962);
Wolf v. Boyd, 238 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957).
180 Ying v. Kennedy, 292 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 914 (1961); United
States ex reL. Tom Man v. Murff, 264 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1959).
181 See Mackay v. Turner, 283 F.2d 728 (9th Cir.), stay denied, 364 U.S. 888 (1960);
Jimenez v. Barber, 252 F.2d 550 (9th Cir.), stay denied, 355 U.S. 943 (1958).
182 Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(c), 66 Stat. 175 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)
(1958), as amended, 75 Stat. 653 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (Supp. IV, 1963).
183 Ibid.
184 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
185 See Bovinas v. Savoretti, 146 F. Supp. 274 (S.D. Fla. 1956) (court specifically
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2. Decree of Naturalization
Under our constitutional and statutory scheme, naturalization always
has been entrusted to designated state and federal courts. 8 6 Considera-
tion of a petition for naturalization is a judicial proceeding in which the
United States is always a potential adverse partys 7 A naturalization
decree rendered by a court in this country, like other judgments, can be
challenged on appeal to a higher court.'88 And, so long as it is unrevoked,
unless void on its face, 8 9 it cannot be collaterally questioned by any
other court or agency. 190
Since 1906, however, the naturalization statutes have provided, without
time limitation, for a judicial proceeding to revoke a decree of naturaliza-
tion obtained through fraud or illegality.' 9 ' In a series of early decisions,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality and propriety of the
revocation procedure. 92 The argument of res judicata was squarely
faced for the first time in United States v. Ness.193 The Government had
opposed a grant of naturalization because the requisite certificate of
arrival was not attached to the petition and immediately after its objec-
tion was overruled, brought suit to revoke the naturalization. In ruling
for the Government, Mr. Justice Brandeis observed:
It was the purpose of Congress, by providing for appearances
under § 11, to aid the court of naturalization in arriving at a
stated ruling without prejudice to new proceedings). Cf. Bridges v. United States, 346
U.S. 209, 234 (1953) (dissenting opinion) (prior judicial decision vacating deportation
order not res judicata); Bridges v. Wixon, 144 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1944), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (prior administrative dismissal not res judicata); Matter
of S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 678 (1962) (prior Board decision became law of the case). Anselmo
v. Hardin, 253 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1958), was to the contrary but it appears to rest on an
erroneous view of the applicability of res judicata to habeas corpus judgments and
of the function of a reviewing court in invalidating administrative actions.
186 The constitutional base is U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The present statutory im-
plementation is Immigration and Nationality Act § 310, 66 Stat. 239 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1421 (1958). See Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509 (1910).
187 Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926). See also Bindczyck v. Finucane, 342
U.S. 76 (1951).
188 Tutun v. United States, supra note 187.
189 Yamashita v. Hinkle, 260 U.S. 199 (1922).
190 Spratt v. Spratt, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 392 (1830); Campbell v. Gordon, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 175 (1810); Lakebo v. Carr, 111 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1940); Annot., 6 A.L.R. 407
(1920). Such a consequence also might attach, because of principles of comity, to a
naturalization decree entered by a foreign court. MacKay v. McAlexander, 268 F.2d 35,
38 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 961 (1960).
191 The present statute is Immigration and Nationality Act § 340, 66 Stat. 260
(1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1958).
192 Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S.
227 (1912).
193 245 U.S. 319 (1917).
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correct decision and so to minimize the necessity for independ-
ent suits under § 15. . . . But in our opinion § 11 and § 15
were designed to afford cumulative protection against fraudulent
or illegal naturalization. 94
Eleven years later Mr. Justice Holmes rejected a res judicata argument
in another suit for revocation for illegal naturalization without a certi-
ficate of arrival, although an effort had been made to supply the certi-
ficate nunc pro tunc. Mr. Justice Holmes found the power to revoke
adequately authorized by "the express words" of the statute.195
More recent expressions of the highest court have not retreated from
these conclusions, although direct confrontations have been avoided. In
the Schneiderman case, the Court assumed the existence of the power
to revoke for illegal procurement, while holding that Schneiderman's
naturalization had not been illegally procured. 196 Knauer v. United
States, 97 was a denaturalization for fraud in the oath of allegiance.
Again the Court did not pass on a contention that the naturalizati6n
judgment was res judicata, finding that the fraud had occurred after
the judgment, and therefore fraud in the oath had not been in issue at
the time the judgment was rendered. More recently the plea of res
judicata was raised in Chaunt v. United States, and was rejected by the
lower court. 98 The issue was not considered by the Supreme Court when
the case was reversed on other grounds.199 And in Costello v. United
States,20 0 the Supreme Court rejected a plea that laches barred a de-
naturalization suit for fraud, brought twenty-seven years after the nati-
ralization, finding that even if such a defense could be made there had
been no showing of laches.
Thus, there appears to be no indication that the Supreme Court is
prepared to abandon its past decisions upholding the statutory authority
to revoke naturalizations improperly granted. Costello in fact appears to
say that the power to denaturalize for fraud will be upheld against any
challenge. And it is difficult to believe that the Court would reject the
language of the statute and its own past explicit holdings and find that
a naturalization judgment could not be revoked for illegality.
194 Id. at 327.
195 Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1928).
196 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, rehearing denied, 320 U.S. 807
(1943).
197 328 U.S. 654, 670-71 (1946).
198 270 F.2d 179, 184 (9th Cir. 1959).
199 Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
200 365 U.S. 265 (1961). Followed in United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963).
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As matters stand, the statute and the judicial decisions sanction a suit
at any time after naturalization to revoke the naturalization judgment
for illegality, concealment of a material fact, or wilful misrepresentation
in its inception; and pleas that the naturalization judgment was res
judicata have not prevailed.20 1
V. CONCLUSION
It is clear enough that questions concerning the finality of prior rulings
or actions have been raised quite frequently in immigration and nation-
ality matters. It is equally dear that it would be futile to attempt to
fashion a consistent rule to be universally applied. Through the years
it appears to have been the dominant rule that the Government could
not be estopped by the rulings or actions of its officers. It is easy to see that
the tides of change have weakened the force of the rule in some areas,
particularly when citizenship status has been involved or when govern-
ment officers are alleged to have acted unfairly. One cannot foresee how
far those tides will carry us, but the trend seems to favor increased
security of status for those who have relied on government actions over
long periods of time.
In some aspects, any change would require an amendment of the
statute. In other areas, a change would entail re-examination of judicial
decisions, in the light of altered conditions and developing legal con-
cepts. In other situations, it would require embarking into territory not
previously explored. The aim of future consideration of this problem
no doubt will be to reach a reasonable accommodation between the
need to safeguard and implement government policies and the desire to
avoid excessive dislocation of individual destinies and to assure a high
degree of fairness in dealings between the Government and the in-
dividual.
201 See also DeLucia v. Flagg, 297 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 837
(1962); United States v. Accardo, 113 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.J.), aff'd per curiam, 208 F.2d
632 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 952 (1954); United States v. Marino, 27 F. Supp. 155
(S.D.N.Y. 1939); United States v. Parisi, 24 F. Supp. 414 (D. Md. 1938). The absence of
a statute of limitations is confirmed in United States v. Hauck, 155 F.2d 141, 143 (2d
Cir. 1946).
